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We live in an ever globalizing world. With greater integration as a result of globalisation it 
is vital that the international trading system provides a platform that sufficiently supports 
the ability of all players to benefit from globalisation.1  This platform is referred to as the 
multilateral trading system which, through the World Trade Organisation provides a series 
of agreements that seek to regulate international trading activity. The current agreements 
were negotiated over a period spanning more than a decade, and therefore has to be 
appreciated within the context of which compromise and agreement were arrived upon. 
This is especially true as the previous platform, the GATT 1947 is said to have become 
obsolete as it failed to accommodate developments within the international trading system. 
Therefore, there are a number of matters that must be weighed when seeking to 
appreciate the context upon which the foundations that this regulatory system was built 
upon. 
 
The notion of international trade integration is often referred to as free trade.2 Although 
not a hundred percent linguistically accurate as even free trade as a policy concept 
contains some restriction, 3  free trade basically means the elimination of all 
artificial/protective trade barriers to the exchange of products across national markets. 
The idea is that prices faced by producers and consumers will be determined by the world 
market, reflected by the availability of such goods.4 Indeed, some early free trade writers 
viewed the world market as one unit, and the quest for benefit and advantage was seen 
as a mutual endeavour throughout the world.5 Much of the underlying considerations and 
objectives of the free trade approach relate to concepts of efficiency in production, a large 
market base and that market barriers lead to inefficiencies.6  
 
 According to trade theorists,7 the basic/pure theory of trade is concerned with answering 
two sets of questions. First, why and how countries gain from trade. Second, is to explain 
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the pattern of that trade, basically meaning why certain countries export some goods, and 
import others.8 The first set is called welfare economics, while the second set is called 
positive economics. Welfare economics is primarily concerned with the effects of trade 
on real income, total satisfaction, welfare and development. Positive economics involves 
considerations that are non-monetary, and focuses on the structure, volume and direction 
of trade: focussing on the efficiency in production and between factors of production.  
 
According to a prominent Classical trade theorist, Adam Smith, trade is a basic 
manifestation of human nature through the propensity to trade, barter and exchange one 
thing for another.9 To substantiate such an assertion, Smith submitted that instead of 
attempting to produce all products that they were able to, a country should focus on 
producing products where they enjoyed a cost advantage over other countries.  By doing 
so, their resources would be concentrated on specialisation in producing such goods 
leading to greater efficiency and higher output.  Smith also advocated for a large market 
base, stating that this would lead to wealth creation.  To achieve this trade should be 
impediment free. Hence countries could then trade their surplus resulting in higher output 
from greater efficiency, at lower prices, based on the requisite terms of trade. The bigger 
the market base for trade the greater the wealth creation and satisfaction leading to 
welfare and development enhancement resulting from specialised production and trade. 
Smith’s theory has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on absolute costs 
differences. However a number of subsequent theorists support the basic idea of 
specialization and large, impediment free market.10  
 
Although mankind have been actively involved in cross border exchange of goods from 
the beginning of recorded history,11 the full impact of trade theory in practice can be 
appreciated from attitudes taken by major economies through their international trade 
policy practices in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.12 As a result of this long 
relationship between man and the need to trade, it is expected that through such activity, 
customary practices developed including the notion of fair exchange and fair distribution 
arising from such activity.13 The influence of free trade precepts are connected to the 
quest for larger market bases, which led to greater unification of markets. As a result, 
barriers within domestic markets fell. This inevitably led to the practice of free trade being 
taken into a wider context as countries practiced such principles when trading across 
national borders.  The repealing of the Corn Laws in 1846 which has been attributed in 
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part to the influence of Smith and Ricardo, was followed by unilateral liberalisation in 
Britain. Many other major European economies like France and Germany followed suit 
and as a result, these major economies negotiated trade liberalising treaties between 
them. Contained within these treaties was the most favoured nation (MFN) principle which 
in essence meant that they would extend to each other any more favourable concessions 
that each might subsequently negotiate with third countries,14 or in other words automatic 
reciprocity. This reinforced the environment for free trade and reciprocity and the 
importance of creating and maintaining a greater market base to this end.  This move 
significantly contributed to multilateralism with the spread of standard provisions and 
treatment. These treaties also had a knock-on effect which led to the adoption of 
conventions to support the objectives of trade liberalising treaties especially in relation to 
transport and communication which further facilitated trade expansion. 15  Hence, the 
regulation of international trade requires a system that ensures automatic reciprocity as 
well as one that is rule based rather than power based, supported by a fair and effective 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
Between the two world wars, conferences/discussions were undertaken on the 
challenges of liberalisation of international trade.16. It is claimed that two aspects of the 
interwar conferences were of great value to international economic law. Firstly was the 
realisation that in the past there was a tendency to be satisfied with sweeping, unspecific 
statements on best principles, which always led to often a meaningless outcome without 
hard and fast commitments. The second was their episodic character.17 These can be 
grouped as gaining an insight from past mistakes where agreements of a vague nature 
did not serve to attain the requirements of the trading environment of the day. What was 
required was a rule-based system with clear certain rules supported by an effective 
dispute settlement mechanism.18 Further, without any long term framework, it was easy 
for trading partners to slip back to mercantilist based policies.19 
 
Subsequent international conferences provided trade officials from major trading nations 
the opportunity to do exactly this, which eventually resulted in the commissioning of draft 
texts dealing with the main trade restrictive issues of the time. The drafting exercises 
allowed officials the opportunity to re-examine problematic issues previously 
circumvented by the unspecific wordings in earlier initiatives, and more importantly, to 
clarify what indeed such ambiguity meant. 20 This motivation led to the crafting of the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO), which was an ambitious initiative said to have 
been capable of producing the platform that would have addressed all these concerns. 
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16 Robert E Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth Legal Publishers, Second 
Edition, 1990, p. 5. 
17 Robert E Hudec, ibid, p. 7 
18 M.Martin, supra note 1 
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Order”, International Organization,  Vol 36, No. 2 International regimes, (Spring 1982), pp 379-415, p. 384 
20 Robert E Hudec, supra note 16, p. 8 
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However, the resulting reluctance by the major players of the time to commit to such far 
reaching reforms in the international system led to the ITO’s failure. Instead the GATT 
1947 which was meant to be only one component of the ITO survived as the multilateral 
trading system regulatory platform for the following five decades, before it was replaced. 
Over the course of fifty or so years, underlying philosophies of regulation changed. The 
GATT 1947 focused on negative harmonisation which is eliminating discrimination. 
During the run up to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, focus moved to a new philosophy for the regulation of international trade, 
namely positive harmonisation, towards harmonisation of national policies. 21  Some 
authors indicate that such harmonisation involves the trading of trade policies.22 What is 
evident in relation to harmonisation however is that the degree of harmonisation needed 
to be stepped up. In fact towards the end of the GATT’s life, the Tokyo Round of 
negotiations actually split the diverse membership of the GATT, indicating that the GATT 
as a regulatory platform could no longer sustain the multilateral trading system. Times 
had changed. There were new players in the international trading system, and the 
international trading environment provided for new opportunities, which really required 
the inclusion of these new players who mostly were developing countries. The result was 
the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. 
 
Much of the discontentment with the regulatory base under the GATT 1947 was expected 
to be abated with the conclusion of the UR which brought some important developments. 
Firstly was the single undertaking commitment which unified the coverage of the 
agreements. This rectified the splitting and segregation of members.23 The WTO also 
created a framework for liberalisation of trade in services, protection of intellectual 
property rights and very importantly, formalised and improved dispute settlement.  
 
The notion of dispute settlement involves conflicting assertions as to the rights and 
obligations of the parties involved.24 A legal dispute refers to conflicts of rights between 
parties within the jurisdiction of a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) but does not 
involve conflicts of interests of the parties.25 Therefore one may conclude that it is the 
rights and obligations that are covered in the agreements through which the dispute is 
raised is of prime importance in a dispute settlement proceeding. Disputes arise from 
freely entered relationships between parties that create expectations as to their future 
conduct. Such expectations are upon what parties plan their future conduct. Such a 
conclusion in turn gives rise to two situations. Firstly, conflict of interests should have 
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been resolved before binding obligations were entered into, as, to allow conflicting 
interests subsequent to reaching a negotiated compromise would make the DSM 
redundant, and secondly, rights and obligations of parties’ under the DSM cannot be 
extended without the parties’ agreement. It is submitted that in the context of a multilateral 
agreement the magnitude of the WTO, such extension would entail proper negotiations 
where the benefits of the proposed wider coverage would be weighed against national 
policies/interests before further binding obligations are entered into.  
 
When parties negotiated the Uruguay Round Agreements, including the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), they intended a rule-oriented system. The pre-UR 
power-oriented system, premised on the use of ones party’s dominance/power to 
influence the conduct of the other party, has been criticised as having the aim of 
redistributing income to the benefit of the powerful26 and not satisfying the balanced 
development requirements resulting from the evolution of the international system in 
general. The rule-oriented approach is instead based on free negotiation.27 This notion of 
free negotiation was necessary as the multilateral trading system grew in scope and 
character, creating new problems in international economic relations resulting from a 
congruence of circumstances.28 To meet the measure of discipline that was required for 
national governments to take initiatives to attain the desired integration, a check on the 
ability of national governments to backslide on their commitments was necessary. 29 
Some authors have recognised that the nature of binding decisions of the rule-oriented 
approach is a basis for long-term obligations based on mutual agreement, and that this 
approach would avoid the risks of over dependence on diplomatic solutions that would 
inevitably reflect the relative power of the parties,30 especially in a forum with such a 
diverse membership as the WTO. The function of multilateral trade rules as described by 
some authors is to maximise welfare and this is achieved through a rule-oriented 
settlement of such disputes.31 Hence, the final outcome of dispute settlement negotiations 
in the UR was a rule-oriented approach evidenced by the adjudicative features of the 
system,32 as an attractive and transparent alternative to unilateral measures and a system 
that could protect the contractual rights of all members including developing nations.33 
 
                                                          
26 See E. Petersmann, “The GATT Dispute Settlement and the Uruguay Negotiations on its Reform”, in P. Sarcevic 
and H. van Houtte (eds), Legal Issues in International Trade, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, pp. 55-57 
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27 Ibid, p. 56.  
28 J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, Constitution and Jurisprudence, The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1998, p. 13. See also D. Mc. Rea”What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement” Journal of International 
Economic Law 7(1) 3-21, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 3. Examples of such congruence were discussed in 
chapter 1 of this paper. 
29 J. Jackson, ibid, p. 24 
30 E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 59 
31J. Jackson, supra note 28 p. 57 
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discussion at E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 64 
33 J. Brewer and S. Young, “WTO Disputes and Developing Countries”, Journal of World Trade 33 (5) 169-182, 
1999, p. 172.  
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A degree of consultations was included into the dispute settlement process, as some 
authors state34 providing for both diplomatic and legal means of addressing the issue at 
hand, therefore maximising the chances of settlement by successive or alternative use of 
different methods. This view on the surface would seem to describe the WTO DSU. 
However, in viewing the decision to negotiate for improving the dispute settlement at the 
UR, and in appreciation of the prevailing situation of dispute settlement at that time and 
the deficiencies that a new DSU was meant to rectify, together with the clear subdivision 
between the conciliatory/consultative and actual panel/adjudicatory process, the view of 
there being alternative processes is criticised as inaccurate. Consultations required by 
Article 4 of the DSU are undertaken as part of the entire dispute settlement process. It 
should be viewed as being sequential in nature. Engaging in consultation is without 
prejudice to the right of any party to proceed with requesting the establishment of a panel 
should an amicable solution not be reached.  
 
A reading of the dispute settlement-negotiating plan of the Negotiating Group on Dispute 
Settlement for the UR negotiating process,35 indicates that there existed a three-pronged 
objective of the negotiating plan. These were, firstly that there was acceptance that 
greater effectiveness and enforceability of rights and obligations under GATT rules was 
beneficial to all members, and therefore desired. Secondly, to achieve this, the rules and 
procedures relating to dispute settlement needed to be strengthened with the ultimate 
view of, the third objective, the attainment of an effective and efficient method of resolving 
disputes arising from the covered agreements. The resulting large number of proposals 
submitted for this exercise36 indicated that there was a high degree of interest across the 
board to achieve the goals identified in the agreed negotiating plan.  
 
However, developing countries have expressed concern over the interpretation and 
application of the WTO Agreements. 37  The accumulated jurisprudence of the WTO 
dispute settlement system thus far reveals that the interest and perceptions of developing 
countries have not been adequately taken into account. The Panels and Appellate Bodies 
have displayed an excessive concern for legalism.38  
Some authors are of the opinion that the Appellate Body prefers the literal approach to 
interpretation.39  This form of interpretation is criticised in that it stops any examination of 
the intention of the parties or objects and purpose of the agreement.40 Therefore, there 
                                                          
34E. Petersmann, supra note 26, p. 57 
35 This Negotiating Group being part of the Uruguay Round negotiating process which consisted of 14 such 
individual groups reporting to the central Trade Negotiations Committee. 
36 E. Petersmann, “Settlement of International and National Trade Disputes Through the GATT:The Case of 
Antidumping Law”, in E. Petersmann and G. Jaenicke, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes in 
International and National Economic Law, PUPIL volume 7, D. Dickie (ed), University Press, Fribourg 
Switzerland, 1992, p. 55 
37 A. Qureshi, “Interpreting World Trade Organisation Agreements for the Development Objective” Journal of 
World Trade 37 (5) 847-882, 2003,  p. 848  
38 Zambia on behalf of the LDC Group, (TN/DS/W/17) 9 October 2002 
39 C. Ehlermann, ““Six Years on the Bench of the World Trade Court”. Some Personal Experiences as a Member of 
the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation”, Journal of World Trade 36 (4) 2002, 605-639, p 
40 A. Qureshi,supra note 37,  p 866. See also A. Chua, “Reasonable Expectations and non-Violation Complaints in 
GATT/WTO Jurisprudence”, Journal of World Trade 32 (2) 27-50, 1998, for a discussion on the principle of 
reasonable expectations and subsequent assumptions as a result.  
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cannot be security and predictability where the intention of parties expressed in the 
objectives and purpose of the agreement are being diluted. Other authors find that 
interpretation of WTO Agreements should be based on the fact that there is an overall 
balance of concessions in the WTO.41  
 
The issue with interpretation of the DSU itself as well as the covered agreements by 
Panels and the Appellate Body can best be appreciated through what this paper seeks to 
introduce as the “extended” approach.42 When Members decided to replace the power-
based approach of relationships between themselves to a more rule-based approach, the 
value of negotiations and discussion between Members were not under-preserved. The 
nature of international/multilateral trade requires an avenue to propose, discuss and 
exchange technical know-how of new issues before binding obligations are undertaken. 
However, the diversity of interests between Members and caution especially amongst 
developing countries has meant that the work progress for the acceptance of expansion 
of regulatory coverage by developing countries has been slow. This has caused a degree 
of frustration amongst some developed countries causing them to increasingly require the 
covered agreements to be interpreted to extract the intentions of the parties of the 
agreements during dispute settlement as a means of “smuggling in” new, especially non-
trade issues into the DSU,43 thereby adjusting the parameters or extent of consent to be 
bound, and displacing the intended rule-based system. 44  The dangers of such an 
approach have been recognised earlier by some authors,45 although others have been 
inclined to assert that such an approach is judicial activism by the appellate body.46 This 
is criticised as such interpretation is as a result of certain Members persistently requiring 
interpretation of the covered agreements that has brought about this phenomenon. Some 
authors observe that these are attempts to use the dispute settlement process to pursue 
                                                          
41 G. Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” 13 E.J.I.L 4 (2002) 753-841 
42 As opposed to the rule-based and power-based approaches discussed above. See discussion in D. Shanker “The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement” Journal of World Trade 36 (4) 721-772, 2002 on how the over use of interpretation  under 
the Vienna convention can undermine the WTO DSU. 
43 According to D. Mc. Rea supra note 28, , p. 3, there is practice of Members to use dispute settlement to gain 
further clarification of provisions in order to expand the scope of existing obligations to encompass matters which 
no negotiating progress has been made. 
44 Accordingly, .J. Weiler in “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats”, Journal of World Trade 35 (2) 
191-207, 2001, p. 194 asks the question if the shift in paradigm in relation to the WTO DSU has been a victory for 
the rule of law or a victory for the rule of lawyers, asserting that such developments have not benefited the deeper 
objectives of the WTO. M. Dunne, “Redefining Power Orientation : A Reassessment of Jackson’s paradigm in Light 
of Asymmetries of Power, Negotiation and Compliance in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 34 Law 
and Policy in International Business 277, Fall 2002, p. 280 suggests the need to reconsider the traditional 
understanding of the realist perspective of “power-based” to a new contextual understanding that is not static in its 
approach to the meaning of “power-based”. D. Shanker supra note 42, discusses how the interpretative approach is 
now influencing the WTO negotiating agenda.  
45 C. Ehlermann, ““Six Years on the Bench of the World Trade Court”. Some Personal Experiences as a Member of 
the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation”, Journal of World Trade 36 (4) 2002, 605-639, at p. 605  
46 R. Steinburg, “Judicial Law making at the WTO : Discursive, Constitutional and Political Constraints”, 98 
American Journal International Law 247, April 2004. See also E. Vermulst, P. Mavroidis and P. Waer, “The 
Functioning of the Appellate Body After Four Years : Towards Rule Integrity”, Journal of World Trade, 33 (2), 1-
50, 1999, p. 23 
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matters that they are unable to win in negotiations despite Article 3 (2) DSU that the DSB 
cannot add or diminish rights and obligations provided under the covered agreements.47  
 
Connected to the “extended” approach is the Trade Stakeholder model.48 This model is 
premised on the pursuance of interests of certain segments of stakeholders or pressure 
groups in a Member’s economy.49 The naive rational of this model50 does not consider 
that to permit the infiltration of such a model into the WTO DSU would be legitimising 
public choice policies.51 Within an administration, a government has to weigh the interests 
of all its stakeholders. It is very often that the many stakeholders in one country would 
have conflicting interests. If the interest of one segment of stakeholders is pursued to the 
detriment of another, the rational given by such authors for the importance of this model 
holds very little water. In pursuing an international agreement, such interests should have 
been weighed domestically and exercised through a member’s foreign policy. The use of 
interpretative strategies to mould or manipulate the outcome of a prior agreement cannot 
logically be calibrated with the intentions of parties at the time of negotiations.52 The use 
of the extended approach to satisfy the trade stakeholder model goes against the grain 
of dispute settlement in general which is to provide security and predictability to the 
covered agreements. 
 
The use of interpretory aids may become necessary when there is ambiguity in the text 
of the agreement.53 Accordingly, there must be good reason to doubt the natural sense 
of the words used in the treaty.54 It is submitted that the opinion of a segment of the 
population of a Member will not satisfy this test. As a government is charged to balance 
the interests of all its stakeholders before undertaking binding commitments 
internationally, a dissatisfied group, notwithstanding an appreciation of the degree of 
influence such a group may have on the survival of the government of the day in that 
country should not negate the principle of pacta sunt servanda.55 
                                                          
47 T. Stewart, P. McDonough and M. Prado, “Opportunities for Increased Liberalisation of Goods “ Making Sure 
Rules Work for All and That Special Needs Are Addressed”, 24 Fordham International Law Journal 652, Nov/Dec 
2000, p. 672  
48 M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd Edition Routledge, 1999  p. 55 are very 
much in favour of this model 
49 J. Schultz, “The Demise of “Green” Protectionism : the WTO Decision on US Gasoline Rule” 25 Denver Journal 
of International Law and Policy 1, Fall 1996, provides a discussion and illustration of such a model is used by 
pressure groups to overcome the competitive edge of foreign exporters and operates as a non-tariff barrier. 
50 Especially explained and applied by M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 48, in Chapter 3 
51 E. Icobucci, “The Interdependence of Trade and Competition Policies”, 21 (2) World Competition 1997, p. 12 for 
a discussion on the ill effects of public choice policies which according to him will negatively impact on global 
welfare. 
52 According to L. Bartels in “Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction : The Case of 
Trade measures for the Protection of Human Rights”, Journal of World Trade 36 (2), 2002,the use of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to justify extraterritorial application of human rights and environmental policies 
cannot be said to form intention of Members notwithstanding Article 3 (2) DSU as this would be adding to rights 
and obligations of members.   
53 See M. Fitzmaurice, “The Practical Workings of the Law of Treaties”, in M. Evans (ed), International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 185-187 
54 Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women During the Night, Advisory Opinion, 
1932, PCIJ, Ser A/B, No. 50, p. 365 
55 Article 26 of VCLT 
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Observations by other authors56 indicate that the Trade Stakeholder model is flawed in 
that Article XVI of the Marrakesh Agreement,57 paragraph 4 requires each member to 
ensure that their domestic laws are in conformity with their obligations under the covered 
agreements. Further it has been pointed out that the purpose of providing the security 
and predictability under Article 3 (2) DSU was for all such stakeholders to regulate their 
affairs in accordance with the covered agreements.  
 
The increasing influence of this model can be seen from an observation of similar-type 
cases over the years. In Tuna/Dolphin 1,58 the United States (US) were not allowed to 
ban imports of Mexican tuna based on the process used to catch the tuna as it did not 
affect the tuna as a product. 59 The US claimed that Mexican fishermen failed to satisfy 
US authorities that the methods they used did not cause damage to dolphins. In criticising 
this ruling, supporters of the Trade Stakeholder model state that such import restrictions 
are not for protection of domestic industry but for the protection of global common 
environment. If it were a global issue, then unilaterally imposing obligations on Mexican 
fishermen would not seem to be a coherent method of solving a global problem. Indeed, 
a global matter would require a global solution.60 Apart from the WTO, there are a number 
of specialised environmental fora that provide a platform for discussion and agreement. 
This of course would entail negotiating a global standard, not necessarily an American 
one, but one that would entail negotiation and bargaining. Dismissing the US attempts to 
make its actions compatible with its obligations under the WTO through Article XX (b), the 
panel stated that in order for the exception to be operative, the test of necessity is to show 
that all other less trade restrictive means of solving the problem were exhausted. This 
included international cooperation. Interestingly, no mention was made on the importance 
of the higher objective of the WTO, namely the need to maintain a liberal trading regime. 
 
In Tuna/Dolphin II61 the panel maintained the need to restrict the unilateral imposition of 
US laws extraterritorially for inducing policy changes in other countries, although 
changing the view of the use of GATT 1994 Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions, stating that 
these could be used for the protection of environment beyond domestic borders, provided 
other less trade restrictive means were exhausted.  
 
                                                          
56 J. Jackson, “International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:Obligation to Comply or Option to 
“Buy Out”?, American Journal International Law, 98 (109), January 2004, p. 116 
57 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation 1994 
58United States-Restriction on Import of Tuna (action brought by Mexico) report circulated but not adopted 1991, 
available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm as at 8.20 pm 16 August 2004 
59 Article III (1), The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
60M. Martin, “Child Labour in Developing Countries:- reasons and solutions”,A presentation at the SLSA Annual 
Conference, University of Striling, 2006. See also M. Martin, “Child Labour: A Global Problem Requiring a Global 
solution”, a 4 part series in the Sunday Citizen, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, ISSN 0856-9754, 20 Jan 2008-10 Feb 
2008, M. Martin "Child Labour, Parameters, Development Implications, Causes and Consequences" Contemporary 
Social Science: Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences Special Issue: Young People, Social Science Research 
and the Law Volume 8, Issue 2, 2013 
61 United States-Restriction on Import of Tuna (action brought by EC) report circulated but not adopted 16 July 
1994, available at www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/edis05_e.htm as at 8.20 pm 16 August 2004 
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Promulgators of the Trade Stakeholder model are further confused over the decision of 
Taxes on Automobiles.62 Although supporting the approach of such cases on a case-by-
case basis,63 the very fundamental differences between the two Tuna cases and this one 
is missed. The consideration in Taxes on Automobiles was that the “wasteful” act of 
consuming higher fuel was occurring in the US. However, in Tunas I & II, the “wasteful” 
act occurred outside the US. Therefore, the unilateral extraterritorial application of US 
laws, in the case of Taxes on Automobiles did not occur. The decision would have been 
different if import restrictions were placed by the US on, say, vegetables that were 
transported on a high fuel consuming trucks in another country.  
 
The decision of Taxes on Automobiles must be distinguished from that of Reformulated 
Gasoline.64 The US restricted the importation of reformulated gasoline from Brazil and 
Venezuela, based on US environmental legislation. Although the panel held Article XX 
(b) exemptions did not apply due to the lack of the US using the least trade-restrictive 
means of achieving its environmental objective, and the AB stressing that the chapeau of 
Article XX meant regard must be held to the rights of both parties, the US claim failed due 
to lack of seeking cooperation with foreign authorities in achieving environmental 
objectives. The difference between the two is that in Reformulated Gasoline, there was 
clear discrimination in the calculation of baseline for emissions in favour of US produce. 
Here, the underlying issue is clearly an attempted abuse of the DSU to achieve public 
choice policy goals, and a blatant disregard of international obligations. 
 
The implications of the consistency in attempts to manipulate negotiated rights and 
obligations through the “extended” approach became clear in Shrimp.65 The issue was 
the same, the unilateral imposition of US laws extraterritorially for inducing policy changes 
in other countries. Interestingly, all of the above cases except for Tuna/Dolphin II involved 
weaker, developing countries, which depend heavily on the US market. In Shrimp 
however, the US finally managed to legitimise its illegitimate use of extraterritorial policy 
imposition. In both instances, the panel and AB found the US to be in violation of its WTO 
obligations. However, the manipulation of the constant insistence of past jurisprudence 
requiring the need for cooperation between national authorities to satisfy US 
environmental concerns was finally been achieved. It is unfortunate that the DSB did not 
enquire if the US had attempted to initiate a multilateral turtle conservation programme  
(the lesser trade restrictive measure accepted as a means of bringing its measure into 
conformity) prior to the unilateral application of its WTO inconsistent embargo on shrimp, 
as in Tuna/Dolphin I. Indeed the Malaysian delegation specifically stated that had the US 
been sincere in its concern for sea turtles, it would have first sought the cooperation of 
the Malaysian government with its requirement for turtle exclusion devises before 
imposing the embargo.  In undertaking international obligations, such cooperation has to 
take place in a proper context, forum and with respect for national sovereignty to decide 
on undertaking treaty obligations, based on its perception of the benefits that would 
                                                          
62 United States-Taxes on Automobiles, report circulated but not adopted 11 October1994, available at 
www.wto.org/tratop_e/envir_e/edis06_e.htm as at 8.20 pm 16 August 2004  
63 M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, supra note 48, p. 413 
64 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS4/AB/R of 12 January 1995 
65 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R  
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accrue from its rights and obligations under such a treaty. The final outcome of Shrimp 
has compromised the sovereignty of all Members of the WTO in allowing the use of 
international cooperation, subsequent to DSB adoption of the AB report that the US 
measure was inconsistent with its obligations, allowing the US to “bring its measure into 
conformity” by legitimising its measure that was found to be inconsistent with its WTO 
obligations in the first place. Any attempt to rationalise this as a lesser trade restrictive 
measure is misplaced. Some authors incorrectly assert that such interpretation is unlikely 
to determine the substantive outcome of a WTO dispute.66 Others place unnecessary 
emphasis on the preparatory work and drafters’ intentions, with the mistaken belief that 
these are sufficient to expand the WTO’s DSB mandate. 67  Such an approach to 
interpretation has been held by other authors to be unstable.68  Further to assert that the 
WTO’s mandate is capable of being expanded through this way is very misplaced. 
According to these authors, the AB is able to expand the scope of Article XX GATT 
exceptions through the application of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969 and 
even have created a whole methodology on how this is to be achieved in future,69 without 
addressing the fundamental question of whether the AB has gone beyond its mandate in 
the first place and if such expansion was what parties intended during negotiations. Other 
authors state that this decision satisfies a public relations objective and that this was 
accomplished without seriously compromising the trade rights guaranteed under the WTO 
Agreement. 70  This contention is contrary to the rule-based approach where public 
relations has no place in the balance of rights and obligations. This decision, 
notwithstanding its clear incompatibility with everything the WTO stands for, would render 
obsolete the introduction of new issues into Ministerial Declarations and WTO work 
programmes. The diplomacy function of international trade relations becomes redundant, 
and the rule-oriented approach becomes senseless, and the entire security and 
predictability of the envisaged DSU of the Punta Del Este Declaration is obliterated. As 
observed by some, the over emphasis by the AB on interpretation in this regard has 
exceeded its mandate. Rights and obligations as a result, are no longer derived from the 
agreement but from the decision of the AB.71 In the above case, such interpretation did 
indeed modify the meaning of compliance and the objectives of Article 3 (7) DSU.  
 
There is a view that the current slant of DSB decisions being declaratory72 in nature 
should continue to be applied.73 According to this view, the ambiguity of such decisions 
                                                          
66 J. Pauwelyn, “How to Win a World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Based on Non-World Trade 
Organisation law”, Journal of World Trade, 37 (6) 977-1030, pp. 997-998 
67 J. Hu, “The Role of International law in the Development of WTO Law” Journal of International Economic law 7 
(1) 143-167, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 150  
68 A. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd edition, Oxford university Press 1986, p. 421 
69 P. Ala’i, “Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of WTO Appellate Body’s Shift to a More 
Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalisation”, 14 American University International Law Review 1129, 1999, p. 
1132-1169 
70 A. Appleton “Shrimp/Turtle:Untangling the Nets”, Journal of International Economic law 2 (3) 477-496, 1999 
71 D. Mc. Rea, supra note 28, p. 6 
72 As opposed to corrective orders 
73C. Carmody, “Remedies and Conformity Under the WTO Agreement”, Journal of International Economic Law 
(2002) pp. 307-326. See also M. Bronckers, “Better Rules for a New Millennium : A Warning Against 
Undemocratic Developments in the WTO”, Journal of International Economic Law (1999), pp. 547-566 
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is strategic, in that it is purposefully unclear to bring parties to the negotiating table.74 The 
rational given is that it allows Members to deliberate without outside interference where 
parties could fashion the relief and the job of the decision maker is only of legal 
interpretation rather than material remediation.75 Taking up this point with regard to issues 
mentioned above,76 then it is not too safe an avenue, due to the imbalance in economic 
power between Members of the WTO. The place for such deliberations to fashion the 
relief for the purposes of discussion so far under this view should be, and is provided for 
under Article 4 of the DSU consultations.77 This point further emphasises the reasons for 
the weaknesses in the consultative process, as Members, usually the more powerful of 
the two would benefit more from delaying the discussions to the last stage of the dispute 
settlement process, whilst continuing the application of the inconsistent measure. 
Furthermore, in the context of the WTO, where representation is governmental and the 
right to participate as third parties is not automatic,78 the environment is quite secure from 
outside interference during negotiations. 
 
The declaratory view draws it support in the WTO from the use of the plural 
“recommendations” of Article 19 (1) and (2) of the DSU, suggesting that a panel might 
make more than one recommendation. It supports its strategic theory from the use of 
bringing the measures “into conformity” in that “conformity” is ambiguous enough to 
achieve the objective of strategic ambiguity.  
 
According to this approach, to achieve compliance of the wrongdoer rather than 
correction of the plaintiff’s injury, would seek to prohibit the reinstitution of an offending 
measure, but not forbid measures of equivalent effect, provided they are implemented in 
a WTO-consistent manner.79 In US Superfund,80 a case involving a tax differential on 
petroleum products refined in the US, the panel explained that the respondent had three 
remedial options and that it was not the role of the panel to dictate any particular one. 
Accordingly, the three options included lowering the tax on foreign-refined crude or raising 
the tax on domestic crude or harmonizing the rate applicable to both domestic and foreign 
refined at some third point.81 Given the GATT’s objective of lowering trade barriers, the 
panel should have noted the three options but recommended the best one in line with the 
objectives and sprit of the WTO Agreement. The ability to make suggestions on how to 
bring measures into conformity with WTO rules is a powerful tool that should be used 
more often.82 Some authors have proposed that Panels should make more use of their 
prevailing power83 to suggest specific measure for implementing WTO dispute settlement 
                                                          
74 C. Carmody, Ibid 
75 Ibid. 
76 Regarding the matters that influence the decisions of a country to participate in a DSP. 
77 Japan and EC submissions TN/DS/W/32 and TN/DS/W/38 are citicized as the DSU provides sufficient avenue for 
consultations within the dispute settlement process. Additional consultations would eat away at the already sensitive 
issue of the duration of a dispute settlement process. 
78 Article 10 DSU 
79 Chi Carmody, supra note 73 
80 United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances BISD 34th Supp 136 (17 June 1987)  
81 C. Carmody, supra note 73  
82 J. Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO : Rules are rules-Toward a more collective 
approach” The American Journal of International Law, April 2000, 94 A.J.I.L. 335  
83 Article 19 (1) DSU 
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decisions. Respondents’ taking the suggested implementing measure would benefit from 
a legal presumption of WTO consistency and would dispense with the problems and 
concerns the “extended” approach has caused, which in turn would create greater faith 
and participation in the system by all Members.84 
 
In settling a dispute under the WTO, Article 3 of the DSU speaks of a “satisfactory 
settlement of the matter” and to a “solution mutually acceptable to parties to a dispute 
and consistent with the covered agreements” with the view of providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The outcome of the Shrimp85 applying the 
concept of strategic ambiguity satisfied neither of these objectives. The outcome of the 
case could be seen as a legitimisation of unilateralism, and would further contribute to the 
exclusion of weaker members in participating in dispute settlement procedures due to the 
increased uncertainty. The contention that implementation in the Shrimp case is a 
multilateral concern and that it illustrates that compliance will probably go far beyond the 
original complainants to involve all those interested in supplying the relevant market86 is 
flawed for a number of reasons. Firstly, the negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation 
agreement should not be made a criterion for conformity as the WTO offers the forum to 
initiate new multilateral agreements, and the DSU as an avenue to do so is incorrect. The 
effect of allowing this interpretation of conformity also impeaches on the sovereignty of a 
Member nation in interfering with its choice of whether to agree to negotiate a new 
endeavor. Further, as in this case87, the pressure by environmental lobbyist was the 
driving force to the US administration enforcing a law that was in existence for some time 
but never applied extraterritorially for obvious reasons.88 Secondly, Members conduct 
themselves based on negotiations already concluded. Accepting negotiations on a 
separated agreement as part of conformity is akin to asking members to negotiate on 
something where negotiations have already concluded and rights and obligations already 
exist, ignoring the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda in public international law and 
disrupting the already existing negotiated balance of rights and obligations.89 The fact that 
the complainant’s persistent assertion that the negotiation of a multilateral turtle 
conservation agreement and the conformity obligations of the US for the case at hand 
were separate issues, sacrifices the main aims of the DSU 90  in favour of strategic 
ambiguity. Thirdly it puts market access (for the complainant) in a worst position then 
before the new negotiations and the burden of obligations are operationalised before an 
agreement is reached. It ignores the issue of intentions of parties when adopting the 
agreement.  
                                                          
84 E. Petersmann, “WTO Negotiators Meet Academics; The Negotiations on Improvements of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System” Journal of International Economic Law (2003),  
85 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R 
86 C. Carmody, supra note 73 
87 s. 601 of the US Endangered Species Act 
88 Paragraph 2 (a) of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
encumbers upon members to have submitted the WTO Agreement to their respective authorities for approval, 
therefore ideally there should never be such an application of a domestic law extraterritorially in violation of WTO 
rules. 
89 S. Charnovitz, “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 4 
(Oct., 2001) pp. 792-832 
90 Article 3 (6) DSU 
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In the Shrimp case, the better approach, it is submitted was for the panel or Appellate 
Body to make a clear, definitive decision whether the measure was either consistent, and 
if it were not, recommend its withdrawal, as in Article 3 (7). The ambiguity of “bringing into 
conformity” and the subsequent qualification by the Article 21 (5) panel that the proposed 
negotiation of a multilateral turtle conservation agreement was sufficient conformity in the 
light of the surrounding circumstances of persistent objection and the manner the 
embargo was initiated in the first place creates extreme uncertainty in the DSU.  
 
The Article 21 (5) panel in this case referred to the good faith efforts to reach a multilateral 
agreement as satisfied and compliance was deemed justified.91 The US government 
never approached the Malaysian Government before instituting the shrimp embargo. It 
only referred to the multilateral turtle conservation agreement after the finding of the 
Appellate Body in the original action. The Malaysian government’s response before and 
during the Article 21 (5) panel proceeding was that compliance and the proposed 
multilateral shrimping agreement were separate and distinct issues. The manner in which 
the panel was able to read good faith from this adds even greater uncertainty and 
increases developing country lack of faith the DSU. According to some authors’ 
Malaysia’s ability to demand another Article 21 (5) panel is open-ended and that WTO 
conformity by the US may be reassessed at any time. 92  It is submitted, that for a 
developing country that has had to endure an embargo in excess of seven years, it is 
highly unlikely that Malaysia would seek another Article 21 (5) panel unlike Canada in the 
case of Brazil-Aircraft,93 for at least two reasons. Firstly it might be circumspect of what 
the panel will rule as in the first instance, and secondly there has been irreparable damage 
to its shrimping industry. The impact of the 21 (5) panel report was also to indirectly to 
create a reasonable period of time in perpetuity. Time can never run out as long as there 
is good faith efforts, the impact of such rulings are very obviously outside the competence 
of the DSU. It has been held that there are three key features that sets the WTO DSU 
apart from the rest. One of these is its ability to render binding decisions.94 Binding 
decisions that are ambiguous enough to accommodate the declaratory view, it is 
submitted, is not worth the financial and political costs for a weaker nation to be willing to 
utilise the dispute settlement system.  
 
Article 3 (1) states that the DSU contains the principles for the management of disputes 
applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994. Article 3 (2) states that the WTO 
dispute settlement system is a central element in providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system95 and the DSB though its recommendations and rulings 
cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations of members provided in the covered 
agreements. Article 3 (3) recognizes that the prompt settlement of situations in which a 
Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered 
                                                          
91 WT/DS58/RW 
92 J. Kearns and S. Charnovitz, “Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO : A Review of DSU Article 21.5”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, (2002) 
93 Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft WTO Doc WT/DS46/ARB 
94 B. McGivern, “Seeking Compliance With WTO Rulings on Globalisation”, 36 The International Lawyer 141, 
Spring 2002 
95 Indeed an effective and credible DSM is pivotal to the success of any agreement. See M. Martin, supra note 1 
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agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the 
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the 
rights and obligations of Members. DSB decisions are aimed at achieving a satisfactory 
settlement of matters in accordance with rights and obligations under the Understanding 
and covered agreements.96 The aim of the DSM is to secure a positive solution to a 
dispute.97 
 
Article 3 (7) of the DSU sets out a hierarchy of four methods of implementation of DSB 
decisions98: 
 
i. a mutually acceptable solution, which is clearly to be preferred; 
ii. in the absence of a mutually acceptable solution, is usually the withdrawal of the measure 
concerned; 
iii. if immediate withdrawal of the measure concerned is impractical parties should agree on 
compensation as a temporary measure; 
iv. as a last resort, the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other 
obligations on a discriminatory basis vis a vis the failing Member, subject to authorization 
of the DSB. 
 
Therefore the DSU and Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 seek to provide a balanced 
approach to the settlement of disputes through firstly, consultations to achieve a mutually 
acceptable solution as envisaged by article 3 (7), and failing a settlement/solution, a 
mechanism that provides transparent, prompt, equitable and positive conclusion through 
the panel and appellate processes. Central to this is that such decisions of the DSB must 
be confined to matters related to in the covered agreements to which the WTO DSU is 
guardian. This conclusion is arrived at from the emphasis placed on the covered 
agreements in Article 3 (2) – (9) and 3. (11) and (12), and Article 1 (1) which cites 
Appendix 1 as containing a list of covered agreements to which the WTO DSU will apply. 
This therefore makes it unequivocally clear that the WTO DSU cannot concern itself with 
matters not arising from or having anything to do with the agreements mentioned in 
Appendix 1.  
 
The impact of the Article 21 (5) Panel on what compliance entails in Shrimp, has damaged 
the DSU as it has created uncertainty from what is to be expected from a dispute 
settlement proceeding. The uncertainty, in turn affects the credibility and stability of the 
system. The economic and political cost of participating in a dispute, especially when the 
complainant is a developing country and the respondent a powerful developed member 
is clear. When the DSM does not create an environment for a weaker country to pursue 
its rights due to the instability of the system, it will cause members to pot for alternative 
means of settling disputes. This when relating to parties of unequal economic and political 
power reverts the system to a power-based as opposed to a rule based one, undoing 
everything the WTO was meant to achieve. 
                                                          
96 Article 3 (4) DSU 
97 Article 3 (7) DSU 
98 A. Rosas, “Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings: An EU Perspective, Journal 
of International Economic Law (2001) pp 131-144 
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